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INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, Paul Little was tried on obscenity charges in the 
Middle District of Florida.
1
  Little operated a pornographic website 
 
*
       J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2012; B.A., Harvard College, 
2008.  I am grateful to Professor Abner S. Greene for his support and guidance 
throughout this process. 
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in California.
2
  Department of Justice agents in Tampa captured 
and downloaded five trailers from and ordered and received five 
DVDs by mail from the website, providing a basis to charge Little 
in that jurisdiction.
3
  Little was convicted of violating federal 
obscenity laws and sentenced to forty-six months in prison.
4
 
Little‘s conviction raises questions about key elements of 
obscenity law.  According to Miller v. California,
5
 the question of 
what constitutes obscenity is answered by a jury, using 
―contemporary community standards,‖ which are understood to be 
local.
6
  The same website that might be considered obscene by a 
jury in Tampa might not be considered obscene by a jury in Los 
Angeles, for example. 
The Miller test originated in an era when most obscenity was 
distributed via postal mail and it was relatively easy to direct 
content at specific parts of the country and not others.
7
  In contrast, 
today obscenity is largely transmitted over the Internet, which 
generally cannot be directed at specific geographic locations.
8
  
Accordingly, judges and scholars have argued that a national 
standard is necessary to avoid subjecting Internet distributors to 
every local standard in the country.
9
  Otherwise, content providers 
will be faced with a race to the bottom in which providers must 
 
 1 United States v. Little, 365 F. App‘x 159, 159–60 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming the 
ruling of the district court). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. at 161. 
 4 Id. 
 5 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 6 Id. at 30, 39. 
 7 Lawrence G. Walters & Clyde DeWitt, Obscenity in the Digital Age: The Re-
Evaluation of Community Standards, 10 NEXUS 59, 64 (2005) (―[T]he community 
standards test was developed at a time when obscenity prosecutions were primarily 
localized in nature and distributors intentionally chose the geographic areas in which they 
distributed or displayed their material.‖). 
 8 Bret Boyce, Obscenity and Community Standards, 33 YALE J. INT‘L L. 299, 347 
(2008) (―[I]t is still not possible for a website operator to restrict access only to certain 
jurisdictions . . . .‖). 
 9 E.g., United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1250 (9th Cir. 2009); Clay Calvert, 
The End of Forum Shopping in Internet Obscenity Cases? The Ramifications of the Ninth 
Circuit’s Groundbreaking Understanding of Community Standards in Cyberspace, 89 
NEB. L. REV. 47, 80 (2010). 
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follow the standards of the most puritanical community in the 
nation.
10
 
Part I of this note considers the origins and development of 
modern obscenity law.  The keystone of this development is the 
Supreme Court‘s 2002 decision in Ashcroft v. ACLU, 11 which 
centered on indecency aimed at children on the Internet.  Ashcroft 
concerned the constitutionality of the Child Online Protection Act 
(COPA), which placed restrictions on material made available or 
communications to minors on the Internet that could be considered 
harmful.
12
  The Court considered whether variations in community 
standards made COPA overbroad when applied to the internet.
13
 
The Ashcroft case became centrally important in a series of 
prosecutions of Internet adult obscenity during the Bush 
administration.
14
  In United States v. Little, the Eleventh Circuit 
upheld Little‘s conviction, rejecting the argument that a national 
community standard is necessary in Internet obscenity cases.
15
  
The Ninth Circuit reached the opposite result in United States v. 
Kilbride, involving an obscenity conviction arising from images 
within an email-spamming operation.
16
  Relying on Ashcroft, the 
Kilbride court ruled that the use of a local standard was an error 
and that a national community standard should have been used.
17
 
Part II of this note identifies a series of policy arguments 
underlying the different community standards and obscenity law 
more generally.  On the one hand, the community standards test 
raises serious constitutional concerns related to due process, 
vagueness, and overbreadth.
18
  On the other hand, there is a strong 
motivation for prosecuting obscenity, which may be amplified by 
 
 10 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 590 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (―[A]dopting 
the community standards of every locality in the United States would provide the most 
puritan of communities with a heckler‘s Internet veto affecting the rest of the Nation.‖). 
 11 535 U.S. 564, 564 (2002). 
 12 Id. at 569–70. 
 13 Id. at 571–72.  
 14 See, e.g., United States v. Little, 365 F. App‘x 159 (11th Cir. 2010); Kilbride, 584 
F.3d 1240, 1252 (9th Cir. 2009).  
 15 See Little, 365 F. App‘x at 164. 
 16 Kilbride, 583 F.3d at 1240. 
 17 Id. at 1254–55. 
 18 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 45–46 (1973) (Douglas, J., Dissenting). 
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the new threats posed by the Internet.
19
  Moreover,  the way one 
defines the community standard may not make a significant 
difference to the outcomes of obscenity prosecutions.
20
 
Part III of this note focuses on proposals to remedy this 
disparate treatment by courts of the community standard.  First, the 
Ashcroft case is applicable only to cases involving obscenity 
directed at minors; the analysis for adult obscenity is inherently 
different.
21
  The justices in Ashcroft did not intend the holding in 
that case to apply to obscenity directed at adults, and Ninth 
Circuit‘s interpretation of Ashcroft put forward in Kilbride is 
incorrect.  Second, from a policy perspective, choosing between a 
national and a local standard is unlikely to rectify the current 
problems with obscenity jurisprudence or unfair treatment of 
pornography producers.
22
  Finally, technological advancements 
allowing for a more accurate or restricted distribution of goods on 
the Internet may be the most effective solution.
23
  Ultimately, 
however, even with improvements in technology, courts must 
clearly and once-and-for-all address the function of the community 
standard, and perhaps the very concept of the obscenity exception 
to the First Amendment. 
 
 19 See, e.g., John Fee, Obscenity and the World Wide Web, 2007 BYU L. Rev. 1691, 
1701–04 (2007). 
 20 See, e.g., Randolph Stuart Sergent, The “Hamlet” Fallacy: Computer Networks and 
the Geographic Roots of Obscenity Regulation, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 671, 715–17 
(1996). 
 21 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 587 (2002) (O‘Connor, J., concurring) 
(―[T]his case still leaves open the possibility that the use of local community standards 
will cause problems for regulation of obscenity on the Internet, for adults . . . in future 
cases.‖). 
 22 See Sergent, supra note 20, at 715–17. 
 23  Lisa Guernsey, Welcome to the Web. Passport, Please, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2001, 
at G1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/15/technology/welcome-to-the-
web-passport-please.html. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Overview 
Obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment.
24
  Early 
American obscenity law utilized a variety of legal tests to 
determine whether a work was obscene, including the Hicklin test, 
which focused on the ability of the material to corrupt ―particularly 
sensitive individuals.‖25  During the early Twentieth Century 
forfeiture actions against works such as James Joyce‘s Ulysses 
were brought based on obscenity.
26
  In subsequent years, the 
Supreme Court justices had considerable difficulty establishing a 
consensus on how to define obscenity.
27
  During this period the 
justices frequently reviewed materials personally to determine if 
the materials were obscene.
28
  The Court finally reached a 
consensus in 1973 when it adopted the Miller test,
29
 but 
determining the meaning, breadth, and applicability of the Miller 
test has plagued courts ever since. 
In the period following Miller, the government had in many 
ways lost the battle over obscenity to the pornography industry, 
and the test is generally understood to be defendant-friendly.
30
  
However, the George W. Bush presidency brought renewed focus 
to obscenity and engaged in an ambitious campaign of 
prosecutions targeting producers of obscene material.
31
  As a 
statutory matter, obscenity is criminalized under state laws and a 
 
 24 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (―There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of 
speech, the prevention of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional 
problem.‖). 
 25 See Boyce, supra note 8, at 311–13.  
 26 Id. at 314–15. See United States v. One Book Called ―Ulysses,‖ 5 F. Supp. 182 
(S.D.N.Y. 1933).  
 27 See id. 
 28 See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 71 (1973) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (explaining that Douglas never chose to act as a censor in this manner because 
he did not think it was constitutional for him to do so).  
 29 Boyce, supra note 8, at 318. 
 30 Fee, supra note 19, at 1695. 
 31 See Boyce, supra note 8, at 324; see also Calvert, supra note 9, at 75 (questioning 
whether President Barack Obama would continue the ―crackdown on obscenity launched 
during the administration of President George W. Bush‖). 
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number of federal laws, targeting such offenses as the distribution 
of obscenity via postal mail and transportation of obscenity via 
interstate commerce or interactive computer network affecting 
such commerce.
32
  Accordingly, the Bush Administration Justice 
Department was able to bring cases in districts of its choosing and 
prosecute Internet pornography producers in the ―least tolerant 
communities,‖ thus avoiding litigation in the pornography 
industry‘s home-base of California.33  Outside of obscenity 
doctrine, the community standards test continues to be applied in 
other areas of First Amendment jurisprudence.
34
 
Currently, the job of defining the category of obscene material 
falls to the states.
35
  In discharging this duty, states face two 
distinct standards: one for obscene material directed at adults and 
another for obscene material directed at children.
36
  In Ginsberg v. 
New York,
37
 the Supreme Court concluded that material that may 
be sold to adults may not necessarily be sold to children and 
reiterated that ―the concept of obscenity or of unprotected matter 
may vary according to the group to whom the questionable 
material is directed.‖38 
 
 32 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1465 (2006); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 847.011 (West 2008); United 
States v. Little, 365 F. App‘x 159, 161 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 33 Calvert, supra note 9, at 64, 85.  
 34 See, e.g., Brown v. Entm‘t Merchs. Ass‘n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2746 (2011); United 
States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1588–90 (2010). 
 35 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973) (―State statutes designed to 
regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited.  As a result, we now confine the 
permissible scope of such regulation to works which depict or describe sexual conduct.  
That conduct must be specifically defined by the applicable state law, as written or 
authoritatively construed.‖). 
 36 Compare Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (defining the test for what constitutes obscene 
material), with Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 659–60 (2004) (questioning the 
constitutionality of COPA, a congressional statute designed to protect minors from 
potentially harmful material online). 
 37 390 U.S. 629, 636–37 (1968) (holding that the New York State Legislature‘s ―power 
to employ variable concepts of obscenity‖ in denying minors‘ access to material 
condemned under statutory law did not ―invade[] the area of freedom of expression 
constitutionally secured to minors.‖). 
 38 Id. at 636 (quoting Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 218 N.E.2d 668, 671 (N.Y. 1966)).  
Moreover, the Court also distinguished between the test for determining obscene material 
directed at minors and child pornography. Compare Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 
661–62 (2004), with New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982) (―The Miller 
standard, like all general definitions of what may be banned as obscene, does not reflect 
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B. The Community Standards Approach 
Miller v. California established the current test for obscenity.
39
  
Under the Miller test, the trier of fact determines 
(a) whether the ―average person, applying 
contemporary community standards‖ would find 
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the 
prurient interest . . . ; (b) whether the work depicts 
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual 
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state 
law; (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific 
value.
40
 
The Court indicated that these standards should be local as 
opposed to national: 
[O]ur nation is simply too big and too diverse for 
this Court to reasonably expect that such standards 
could be articulated for all 50 states in a single 
formulation . . . . It is neither realistic nor 
constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment 
as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi 
accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable 
in Las Vegas, or New York City.
41
 
The first prong of the test emphasizes that the First 
Amendment was designed to protect works of serious value, not 
―hard-core sexual conduct for its own sake,‖ and that states have a 
 
the State‘s particular and more compelling interest in prosecuting those who promote the 
sexual exploitation of children.‖). See also Fee, supra note 19, at 1696 (explaining that 
the Supreme Court found it necessary in Ferber to hold that child pornography was 
uncategorically protected because of the difficulty experienced by the states and the 
Federal Government in prosecuting obscenity post-Miller).  Child pornography is not 
protected by the First Amendment and therefore is not subject to the community 
standards approach set forth in Miller. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761; Fee, supra note 19, at 
1696–97. 
 39 413 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1973).  
 40 Id. at 24 (internal citations omitted).  
 41 Id. at 30, 32.  The Miller case itself involved contemporary community standards of 
the state of California. Id. at 31. 
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right to regulate such material to protect public morals.
42
  The first 
prong requires that the work appeal to the prurient interest as 
determined by contemporary community standards.  The reference 
to contemporary community standards clarified that ―obscenity is 
not [to be] judged by the sensitivities of the most easily offended 
individuals or by the morals of the past,‖ but rather that juries 
should play the role of ―representatives of the various communities 
from which they come.‖43  The Miller test‘s reliance on the 
application of different community standards is particularly unique 
in American jurisprudence because the treatment of constitutional 
rights generally does not vary from one geographic area to another. 
The second prong reinforces the community approach by 
permitting the states to individually determine which sexual 
conduct they find patently offensive.
44
  On the same day as Miller, 
the Court decided in Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton that Georgia 
could prohibit the showing of obscene movies in an adult movie 
theater.
45
  The Court highlighted the States‘ ―long-recognized 
legitimate interest‖ in regulating obscene material, based on 
notions of decency, quality of life, total community environment, 
the tone of commerce, and public safety.
46
 
The third prong of the Miller test addresses the potential impact 
the test may have on First Amendment-protected speech.  The 
Supreme Court included the third prong to narrow the regulation of 
obscenity, ―so as not to chill works of serious social value.‖47  
Post-Miller, the Supreme Court clarified that whether the work in 
fact has serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value is 
determined from the perspective of a reasonable person, rather than 
a juror in a given community.
48
 
One year after Miller, the Court reviewed an obscenity 
prosecution which had been decided before the Miller ruling was 
 
 42 Fee, supra note 19, at 1694 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 35). 
 43 Id. at 1695. 
 44 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24–25. 
 45 413 U.S. 49, 55, 57–59, 69–70 (1973).  
 46 Id. at 57–59.   
 47 Id. at 1694. 
 48 Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500–01 (1987). 
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announced.
49
  The defendants had used the mail to distribute 
advertisements and copies of a book entitled ―The Illustrated 
Presidential Report of the Commission on Obscenity and 
Pornography.‖50  To determine whether the publication contained 
obscene material, the trial court judge instructed the jury to 
consider ―the standards generally held throughout this country.‖51  
In its review, the Court found that use of a national standard did 
not constitute reversible error, despite the fact that Miller calls for 
a local standard.
52
  In his dissent, Justice Brennan responded to the 
majority‘s affirmation of the local standard set out in Miller and 
raised the concern that the use of a local standard would force 
producers to cabin their creations within the standard of the most 
restrictive community where their goods may travel, potentially 
leading to self-censorship.
53
 
Brennan‘s concern is particularly showcased by the numerous 
forum options for prosecutors in determining where to try an 
obscenity case.  Obscenity prosecutions can be tried in the 
community where the obscene material is purchased, where the 
material is produced, or where the producer is primarily located.
54
  
In 1982, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the Florida obscenity 
conviction of a Los Angeles producer who sent content via the 
mail to an undercover FBI agent operating in Florida.
55
  The court 
confirmed that the use of common carriers to ship obscene 
materials is a continuing offense in every judicial district through 
 
 49 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 96 (1974).  The defendants were indicted in 
1971 and later convicted. Id. at 91.  The 9th Circuit affirmed on June 7, 1973. Id. at 97.  
Miller v. California was decided on June 21 of that year. Id.  
 50 Id. at 91. 
 51 Id. at 103.  
 52 Id. at 107–08 (―Judging the instruction given by the District Court in this case by 
these principles, there is no doubt that its occasional references to the community 
standards of the ‗nation as a whole‘ delineated a wider geographical area than would be 
warranted by Miller . . . . Whether petitioners were materially prejudiced by those 
references is a different question.  Certainly the giving of such an instruction does not 
render their conviction void as a matter of constitutional law.‖). 
 53 Id. at 144 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 54 See, e.g., United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 832 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 55 Id. at 829.  
HERTZ-BUNZL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2011  2:00 PM 
154 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 22:145 
which the material passes, and that the legislature intended this 
flexibility in venue when it enacted the federal obscenity statutes.
56
 
Similarly, in Sable v. FCC
57
 the Court upheld an amendment to 
the Communications Act of 1934 imposing a ban on obscene ―dial-
a-porn‖ telephone messages despite the fact that the ban would 
potentially subject operators to varying community standards.
58
  
The Court explained that while dial-a-porn operators could be held 
to varying community standards depending on where in the 
country the phone service was being accessed, this fact alone did 
not render the statute unconstitutional.  Rather, if the distributors 
wanted to limit the community standards applicable to their 
material, then the burden was on the distributors to implement a 
screening system that selectively served those areas of the 
country.
59
 
The first major obscenity case involving the Internet was 
decided by the Sixth Circuit in 1996.
60
  In United States v. 
Thomas,
61
 the court affirmed the Tennessee conviction of a 
husband and wife who operated an electronic bulletin board from 
their home in California from which members could download 
 
 56 Id. at 830.  The case involved 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (prohibiting the use of common 
carriers to transport obscenity) and 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (prohibiting the use of interstate 
commerce to transport obscenity), both of which are offenses within the provisions of 18 
U.S.C. § 3237(a), which holds that any offense involving the use of the mails or the 
transportation of goods in interstate commerce is a continuing offense that may be 
prosecuted in every district in which the crime takes place, including the district in which 
the materials were received. Id. at 830–31.  Congressional intent in this manner is 
supported by the 1958 revision of these statues to overrule a Tenth Circuit decision 
holding that there was not a continuing offense in every district in which the material was 
carried. Id. at 831 n.7.  
 57 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
 58 492 U.S. at 123–26.  ―Dial-a-porn‖ refers to sexually oriented pre-recorded 
messages that callers pay to listen to. Id. at 117–18. 
 59 Id. at 125–26.  The Court maintained this burden on distributors even after 
acknowledging that such a screening system may be impractical or prohibitively 
expensive. Id. at 125. The Court did, however, invalidate a portion of the law that would 
have completely banned dial-a-porn messages that were indecent as applied to minors. Id. 
at 130–31.  The Court stated that the ban would have unconstitutionally limited lawful 
adult-to-adult speech because of the chance that the speech would reach children. Id. 
 60 See Mitchell P. Goldstein, Congress and the Courts Battle Over the First 
Amendment: Can the Law Really Protect Children From Pornography on the Internet?, 
21 J. MARSHALL J. COMP. & INFO. L. 141, 155 (2003). 
 61 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996). 
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pornographic content.
62
  The defendants and amicus curiae, 
including the ACLU,
63
 argued that the use of such computer 
technology required a definition of community ―based on the 
broad-ranging connections among people in cyberspace rather than 
the geographic locale of the federal judicial district of the criminal 
trial.‖64  To hold otherwise, they argued, would ―chill‖ permitted 
speech because anyone could access the material; the electontric 
bulletin board operators had no means of geographically restricting 
access to the online content.
65
  The court rejected the argument, 
finding that the operators of the site, just like the dial-a-porn 
operators, did have knowledge of and control over where the 
material was being distributed because part of the membership 
application for the bulletin board involved users submitting home 
addresses and local phone numbers.
66
  In addition, the court found 
that Sable supported the contention that it is the responsibility of 
the distributor to tailor its distribution to the communities it 
chooses to serve and that the distributor may have to incur the 
costs necessary to develop a system to accomplish this objective.
67
  
After Thomas, some commentators argued that the Internet was a 
unique medium, requiring a national standard based on the nation‘s 
community of Internet users.
68
 
C. Congressional Regulation of the Internet and the Ashcroft Case 
Congress joined in the obscenity debate in the 1990s and began 
focusing on laws to make the Internet safer for children,
69
 like the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA)
70
 which ―prohibits 
 
 62 Id. at 705.   
 63 Id. at 711 n.8.  
 64 Id. at 711.  
 65 Id.  
 66 Id.  
 67 Id. at 711–12.  
 68 See, e.g., Gyong Ho Kim & Anna R. Paddon, Cybercommunity Versus Geographic 
Community Standard For Online Pornography: A Technological Hierarchy in Judging 
Cyberspace Obscenity, 26 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH. L.J. 65, 85 (1999) (arguing content 
standards should be more permissive for the Internet than for other mediums such as 
radio or television in part because of the lack of a ―captive audience‖ problem).  
 69 See Goldstein, supra note 60, at 158. 
 70 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1996), invalidated by Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 857–58 
(1997).  
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the knowing transmission of obscene or indecent messages to any 
recipient under 18 years of age‖ and ―prohibits the knowing 
sending or displaying of patently offensive messages in a manner 
that is available to a person under 18 years of age.‖71  Affirmative 
defenses are available if the defendant takes ―good faith, 
reasonable, effective and appropriate actions‖ to restrict access to 
minors or requires proof of age.
72
  The CDA standard for 
determining obscenity differed from the Miller test in two distinct 
ways: it did not contain equivalents to either the prurient interest or 
serious value prongs (prongs one and three of the Miller test 
respectively).
73
 
The Court invalidated the law.
74
  The Court found that the law 
denied adults speech they have a constitutional right to 
communicate, and was not the least restrictive means of achieving 
the government‘s purpose.75  In addition, the law‘s potential 
application was too wide in scope, making it vague and 
troublesome under the Court‘s First Amendment analysis.76  The 
Court speculated that a speaker would not know if he or she was 
violating the law when discussing topics such as birth control and 
prison rape, causing a chilling effect.
77
  In addition, the Court 
clarified that ―the ‗community standards‘ criterion as applied to the 
Internet means that any communication available to a nation wide 
audience will be judged by the standards of the community most 
likely to be offended by the message.‖78 
 
 71 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 859 (1997) . 
 72 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5). 
 73 Reno, 521 U.S. at 873.  
 74 Id. at 882.  The Court allowed one part of the law to survive through its severability 
clause, retaining the portion of the law pertaining to the ―knowing transmission‖ of 
obscene—but not indecent—messages to minors. See id. at 882–83.  O‘Connor, joined by 
Rehnquist, concurred and dissented in part, and argued that the display portions of the 
law should be struck down but not the ―knowing transmission‖ or ―knowing sending‖ 
portions of the law where the communicator knows all the recipients are minors and not a 
combination of adults and minors. Id. at 891–93 (O‘Connor, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  
 75 Id. at 874.  The government argued the statute‘s burden on speech could be cured 
through the good faith defenses, although the Court doubted whether age verification 
techniques were economically viable. Id. at 881–82. 
 76 Id. at 870.  
 77 Id. at 871–72.  
 78 Id. at 877–78.  
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Congress‘ second attempt79 at regulating obscene material 
aimed at children was the Child Online Protection Act (COPA).
80
  
COPA prohibits the knowing communication to minors of 
―material that is harmful to minors‖ for commercial purposes.81  
This law incorporates a modification of the Miller test, making it 
applicable to material harmful to minors.
82
  A group of website 
operators, whose websites provided materials such as sexual health 
and gay and lesbian resources intended for an adult audience, 
brought a facial challenge to the statute.
83
  The website operators 
were concerned that their materials might be considered harmful to 
minors by some community standards.
84
  Thus, they argued that 
―COPA violated adults‘ rights under the First and Fifth 
Amendments because it (1) ‗create[d] an effective ban on 
constitutionally protected speech by and to adults‘; (2) ‗[was] not 
the least restrictive means of accomplishing any compelling 
governmental purpose‘; and (3) ‗[was] substantially overbroad.‘‖85  
The district court invalidated the law, finding in part that it was not 
the least restrictive means of preventing minors from accessing 
harmful material.
86
  The Third Circuit affirmed on related but 
different grounds, holding that the use of community standards 
rendered the statute substantially overbroad because web 
publishers were not able to limit access based on the geographic 
locale of particular Internet users, thus limiting the content 
 
 79 See Goldstein, supra note 60, at 166. 
 80 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1998). 
 81 Id. § 231(a)(1). 
 82 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 569–70 (2002).  The statute defines ―material that 
is harmful to minors‖ as material that ―(A) the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards, would find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to 
minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest; (B) 
depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with respect to minors, an 
actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or 
perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; 
and (C) taken as a whole, lacks serious, literary, artistic, political or scientific value for 
minors.‖ 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6) (emphasis added). 
 83 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 571.  
 84 Id. at 571.  
 85 Id. at 571–72 (alterations in original) (quoting Brief for the Respondent at 100–01, 
Ashcroft, 535 U.S. 564 (No. 99-1324)). 
 86 Id. at 572.  
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produced to that deemed acceptable by only the ―most puritan of 
communities‖ in the nation.87 
The Supreme Court considered the issue in Ashcroft v. ACLU, 
and reversed and remanded the case to the Circuit court.
88
  Justice 
Thomas, announcing the opinion of the Court, stated that a local 
standard is not unconstitutional.
89
  The Court relied on Hamling v. 
United States,
90
 in which the Court held that ―requiring a speaker 
disseminating material to a national audience to observe various 
community standards does not violate the First Amendment.‖91  
The Court reiterated that it is acceptable to prohibit 
communications considered obscene under some local standards 
but not others.
92
  Justice Thomas added that the Third Circuit 
distinguished these cases based on the speaker‘s ability to control 
the distribution of the controversial material to certain geographic 
communities.
93
  However, Thomas noted that in neither Hamling 
nor Sable was the speaker‘s targeting ability integral to the legal 
outcome.
94
  Instead, the Court emphasized that the Internet does 
not call for a different standard, and ―[i]f a publisher wishes for its 
material to be judged only by the standards of particular 
communities, then it need only take the simple step of utilizing a 
medium that enables it to target the release of its materials to those 
communities.‖95 
 
 87 ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 175 (3d Cir. 2000).  The court distinguished United 
States v. Thomas, 74 F. 3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996), finding it dissimilar to a modern Internet 
case because the defendant in Thomas had the ability to geographically distinguish 
among its bulletin board users. Id. at 176–77.  
 88 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 564–65.  Justice Thomas announced the opinion of the court, 
supported by Justices Rehnquist and Scalia.  Justices O‘Connor and Breyer joined the 
majority opinion in part and also wrote separate concurring opinions.  Justice Kennedy 
concurred, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsberg, and Justice Stevens dissented. Id. at 
564. 
 89 Id. at 566. 
 90 418 U.S. 87 (1974). 
 91 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 580 (citing Hamling, 418 U.S. at 106).  
 92 Id. at 581.  
 93 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 581–82 (citing Sable Commc‘ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 
115, 125–26 (1989)).  
 94 Id. at 582.  
 95 Id. at 583.  The justices considered that because of the law, content that otherwise 
could be openly displayed would be put behind age verification screens, but did not find 
any substantial overbreadth as a result. Id. at 584–85.  
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Thomas indicated that he did not believe that the effect of local 
community standards with regard to COPA would be any greater 
than under other federal obscenity statues.
96
  According to 
Thomas, the Court in Reno established the constitutionality of 
these obscenity laws as applied to the Internet.
97
  In addition, under 
Miller, community standards are not defined by reference to a 
particular geographic area.
98
  Therefore, the Court held, a national 
standard is not required and, even under a national standard a juror 
will inevitably draw from his experiences in the community from 
which he comes.
99
  Thomas also distinguished  COPA  from the 
CDA, because the CDA‘s use of community standards on the 
Internet was ―particularly problematic in light of the CDA‘s 
breadth and vagueness,‖ covering material not limited by the three 
prongs of the Miller test.
100
  In contrast, COPA followed Miller 
and importantly excluded material with literary, artistic, political or 
scientific value for minors.
101
 
The Court made clear that the holding of the case was limited 
to the narrow issue presented.  ―[W]e hold only that COPA‘s 
reliance on community standards to identify ‗material that is 
harmful to minors‘ does not by itself render the statute substantially 
overbroad . . . .‖ 102  The justices pointed out that the ruling did not 
express a position as to whether the statute might be overbroad, 
vague, or would survive strict scrutiny.
103
 
O‘Connor joined the Thomas opinion in distinguishing COPA 
from the CDA and finding COPA not substantially overbroad 
because of community standards.
104
  She wrote separately to point 
out that many of the materials at issue might already be exempt 
 
 96 Id. at 583–84.  Specifically, the Court used the example of 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) 
(1994). Id. 581 n.11. 
 97 Id. at 584 (pointing out that in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877 n.44 (1997), that 
transmitting obscenity or child pornography on the Internet was already illegal under 
federal law for adults and juveniles).  
 98 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 576 (citing Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974)). 
 99 Id. at 576–77.   
 100 Id. at 577–78.   
 101 Id. at 579.   
 102 Id. at 585.  
 103 Id. at 585–86. 
 104 Id. at 577–78, 585. 
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from COPA‘s coverage because of their literary, artistic, political 
or scientific value for minors.
105
  For instance, the sex education 
materials would likely have scientific value in every jurisdiction.
106
  
Although she was comfortable denying the facial challenge, 
O‘Connor left open the possibility of future facial or as applied 
challenges to the law.
107
  ―[G]iven Internet speakers‘ inability to 
control the geographic location of their audience, expecting them 
to bear the burden of controlling the recipients of their speech . . . 
may be entirely too much to ask, and would potentially suppress an 
inordinate amount of expression.‖108  O‘Connor further explained  
that Miller does not prohibit a national standard; rather Miller held 
a national standard was neither required nor unconstitutional.
109
  
She continued that a national standard may have been 
―unascertainable‖ to the Miller court, but developments like the 
Internet have made jurors more aware of the views of adults in 
other parts of the country.
110
  Therefore, according to O‘Connor, 
―[a]doption of a national standard is necessary in my view for any 
reasonable regulation of Internet obscenity.‖111 
Breyer also joined the Thomas opinion in holding the 
community standards element did not itself render COPA 
substantially overbroad.
112
  Breyer wrote separately, arguing that 
Congress intended the word community in the statute to refer to 
the view of the nation‘s adult community as a whole concerning 
what is appropriate material for minors.
113
  Breyer pointed out that 
while the word community is not defined in the statute, the 
legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend the word 
to refer to separate standards among different communities.
114
  
Breyer highlighted a House of Representatives report which 
indicated that the committee members understood community 
 
 105 Id. at 586 (O‘Connor, J., concurring). 
 106 Id. at 587.  
 107 Id.  
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 588 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 31 (1973)).  
 110 Id. at 588–89.  
 111 Id. at 587. 
 112 Id. at 585 (plurality opinion). 
 113 Id. at 589–90 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 114 Id.  
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standards as an ―adult standard . . . reasonably constant among 
adults in America‖ rather than a ―geographic standard.‖115  For 
Breyer, the advantage of this position was the ability to avoid 
examining otherwise serious First Amendment problems such as 
providing ―the most puritan of communities with a heckler‘s 
Internet veto affecting the rest of the Nation.‖116 
Kennedy concurred on the basis that the lower court‘s ruling 
did not sufficiently assess the breadth of COPA‘s coverage and the 
possible variations in community standards across the country, 
making it impossible to determine if the law was really 
overbroad.
117
  According to Kennedy, overbreadth depends on the 
―extent of speech covered and the variations in community 
standards with respect to that speech.‖118  However, Kennedy 
explained, there was a lack of information before the Court 
pertaining to whether, for instance, the variance of community 
standards under this law would be any more severe than variations 
of community standards under the federal obscenity statutes.
119
 
Kennedy did identify objectionable elements of the law, finding 
that ―the economics and technology of Internet communication 
differ in important ways from those of telephones and mail.‖120  
―[I]t is easy and cheap to reach a worldwide audience on the 
Internet, but expensive if not impossible to reach a geographic 
subset.‖121  Nonetheless, Kennedy found that this ―observation ‗by 
itself‘‖ was insufficient to enjoin the act.122 
 
 115 Id. at 590 (emphasis omitted) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 105-775, at 28 (1998)).  
Kennedy noted that Breyer‘s position on the legislative history is unsupported by the 
record and relies on only one statement to infer the total view of Congress. Id. at 596 
(Kennedy, J., concurring).  Stevens agreed with Kennedy‘s position, finding that the clear 
text of the statute indicated that jurors should consider community standards a ―term of 
art that has taken on a particular meaning in light of our precedent,‖ relating back to 
Miller which held that a national standard would be an ―exercise in futility.‖ Id. at 607 
n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 116 Id. at 590 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 117 Id. at 591 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 118 Id. at 597. 
 119 Id. at 598.  
 120 Id. at 595.  
 121 Id. (citations omitted). 
 122 Id. at 597.  
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Stevens dissented on the basis of COPA‘s overbreadth, arguing 
that the statute covered ―arguably every depiction of nudity‖ which 
is ―in some sense erotic with respect to minors.‖123  Stevens 
pointed out that because ―erotic with respect to minors‖ is broader 
than the Miller conception of obscenity, the sweep of the law is  
expansive, and the danger of overbreadth is very real.
124
  Stevens 
indicated that the Court of Appeals was correct in finding that 
COPA would impact a large amount of protected speech that 
would ―not be considered harmful to minors in many 
communities.‖125  However, according to Stevens, Thomas‘s 
solution of forcing the speaker to choose a different medium and a 
more limited forum of expression would make the overbreadth 
doctrine ―toothless.‖126  Stevens instead distinguished Ashcroft 
from Hamling and Sable;
127due to a ―fundamental difference in 
technologies, the rules applicable to the mass mailing of an 
obscene montage or to obscene dial-a-porn should not be used to 
judge the legality of messages on the World Wide Web.‖128  
Stevens clarified that he was primarily concerned with the 
suppression of racy advertisements and online magazines that 
could be considered harmful to minors in conservative 
communities, not ―[t]he kind of hard-core pornography involved in 
Hamling‖ which he believed ―does not belong on the Internet.‖129 
On remand, the Third Circuit reaffirmed the preliminary 
injunction against enforcement of COPA.
130
  The court determined 
that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits that COPA 
was overbroad and would fail strict scrutiny.
131
  The Supreme 
Court heard the case again in 2004, this time invalidating COPA 
because it burdened adult access to protected speech and because 
 
 123 Id. at 608 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 124 Id. at 608–09.  
 125 Id. at 611.  
 126 Id. at 606 n.2.  
 127 See id. at 605.  
 128 Id. at 606.  
 129 Id. at 611–12.  
 130 ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 243 (3d Cir. 2003), aff’d and remanded, 542 U.S. 
656 (2004). 
 131 Id. at 271. 
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less restrictive alternatives were available.
132
 As a result the 
Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court‘s grant of the preliminary 
injunction and remanded the case for trial at the district court.
133
  
On remand, the district court permanently enjoined the law for 
being impermissibly vague, overbroad  and for not being the least 
restrictive means to achieve a compelling government interest.
134
 
The Third Circuit affirmed
135
 and certiorari to the Supreme Court 
was denied.
136
 
D. Prosecutions of Adult Obscenity and the Application of the 
Ashcroft Case 
While the Supreme Court was interpreting laws pertaining to 
obscenity directed at children on the Internet, lower courts began 
to hear a new wave of prosecutions of obscenity directed at 
adults.
137
  The Department of Justice under George W. Bush 
launched several high-profile obscenity prosecutions around the 
country against southern California-based pornography producers.  
Some of the recent and most prominent cases are discussed 
below.
138
 
 
 132 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 656–57, 666–67 (2004) (―Blocking and filtering 
software is less restrictive alternative [to COPA]‖). 
 133 See id. at 658–59. 
 134 ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 135 Id. at 181.  
 136 Mukasey v. ACLU, 129 S. Ct. 1032 (2009). 
 137 See generally United States v. Little, 365 F. App‘x 159 (11th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Adams, 337 F. App‘x 336, 340 (4th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the availability of 
material from the Internet as acceptance of it by the local community for Miller test 
purposes), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1161 (2010); United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240 
(9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting local standards in Internet obscenity cases); United States v. 
Extreme Assocs., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578 (W.D. Pa. 2005) (ruling federal obscenity 
laws unconstitutional), rev’d, 431 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding binding Supreme 
Court precedent); United States v. Stagliano, 693 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2010) (rejecting 
motion to dismiss Internet obscenity prosecution); United States v. Harb, No. 2:07-CR-
426 TS, 2009 WL 499467, at *5 (D. Utah Feb. 27, 2009) (holding that the Miller 
standard and not the Ashcroft standard applies to sales of obscenity over the Internet); 
Rhett Pardon, Plea Deal Reached in Torture Portal Obscenity Case, XBIZ NEWSWIRE 
(July 13, 2010), http://newswire.xbiz.com/view.php?id=122757 (reporting that a plea 
deal was reached in NJ federal court for the operator of TorturePortal.com who sent 
videos by mail to customers).  
 138 See Calvert, supra note 9, at 64–68.  
HERTZ-BUNZL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2011  2:00 PM 
164 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 22:145 
In 2003, federal prosecutors in Pittsburgh indicted two owners 
of Extreme Associates, a California-based content distributor.
139
  
Extreme Associates required that consumers seeking to access its 
website become members, and asked for a username, password, 
and credit card information, but the consumer‘s geographic 
location was not required.
140
  A United States Postal Inspector
141
 
registered an account and received content by mail and over the 
Internet in the Western District of Pennsylvania.
142
  The content in 
question included, among other things, the video Forced Entry, 
which simulated a violent rape.
143
  The defendants pleaded guilty 
in 2009 and each received one year and one day in prison.
144
  As 
part of the plea agreement the defendants forfeited their domain 
name. The company is now defunct.
145
 
Defendants Sami and Michael Harb of the Ohio-based 
company Movies by Mail were indicted in 2007
146
 and tried for 
 
 139 See Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 584, 586–88, 593 (dismissing the 
indictment on the basis that federal obscenity statutes violated substantive due process 
rights of liberty and privacy (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003))) rev’d, 431 
F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding binding Supreme Court precedent). See also Paula Reed 
Ward, Obscenity Case Begs Question: Whose Standard? Extreme Associates Trial May 
be Catalyst for Change, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 25, 2009, at B1, available at 
http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/09025/944328-52.stm. 
 140 Extreme Associates, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 581–82.  The membership form referenced 
by the district court included a Pittsburgh address along with the credit card information. 
Id. at 583.  
 141 Id at 582.  The Postal Inspection Service is the law enforcement arm of the United 
States Postal Service. See Mission, U.S. POSTAL INSPECTION SERV., 
https://postalinspectors.uspis.gov/aboutus/mission.aspx (last visited Sep. 4, 2011).  
 142 Id. at 584–85.  The indictment was based on violations of 18 U.S.C.§§ 1461, 1462, 
and 1465. Id. 
 143 Randy Dotinga, Legal Threats Stalk Adult Sites, WIRED (June 15, 2004), 
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2004/06/63838.  
 144 Paula Reed Ward, Porn Producer, Wife Get 1-year Jail Terms: Acrimonious 
Obscenity Case Took 7 Years, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 2, 2009, at A1, available 
at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/09183/981250-53.stm.  
 145 Grant Gross, Couple Gets Prison Time for Internet Obscenity: Extreme Associates 
Owners are both Sentenced to a Year in Prison, IDG NEWS SERV. (July 3, 2009), 
http://www.techworld.com.au/article/309771/couple_gets_prison_time_internet_ 
obscenity/.   
 146 Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Federal Grand Jury in Salt Lake City Charges 
Cleveland Men with Obscenity Violations (June 28, 2007), available at  
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/June/07_crm_471.html.  
HERTZ-BUNZL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2011  2:00 PM 
2011] COMMUNITY STANDARDS IN THE INTERNET ERA 165 
violations of federal obscenity laws in the District of Utah.
147
  
Undercover agents ordered DVDs produced by Max Hardcore and 
Extreme Associates from the Harbs‘ website and had the DVDs 
mailed to a Utah address.
148
  The defendants each pleaded guilty to 
one count of selling obscene material and were sentenced to a year 
and a day in prison.
149
 
Loren Jay Adams was charged with the transportation of 
obscene materials in the federal district court in West Virginia.
150
  
Adams, based in Martinsburg, Indiana, was convicted in 2008
151
 
and received thirty-three months in jail.
152
  The content at issue 
included bestiality and fisting videos.
153
  Officers ordered the 
secondhand DVDs from Adams‘ website and received them via 
postal mail.
154
  During the trial, Adams unsuccessfully attempted 
to offer Internet-based evidence to show the local community 
standards encompassed the work he had sold.
155
 
 
 147 United States v. Harb, No. 2:07-CR-426 TS, 2009 WL 499467, at *1 (D. Utah Feb. 
27, 2009) (rejecting motion to dismiss and declining to transfer venue).  
 148 Press Release, supra note 146.  The indictment indicated that the defendants had 
sent 683 packages to addresses in Utah in 2006, 149 of them to Salt Lake City addresses. 
Id. 
 149 Stephen Hunt, Ohio Men Sentenced for Mailing Porn Films to Utah, SALT LAKE 
TRIBUNE (Nov. 19, 2009, 5:40 PM), http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id= 
13826641&itype=NGPSID&keyword=&qtype=. 
 150 United States v. Adams, 337 F. App‘x 336, 336, 338, 340 (4th Cir. 2009) (affirming 
the ruling of the district court).  
 151 Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Indiana Man Convicted of Obscenity 
Violations by Federal Jury in West Virginia (Oct. 1, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/October/08-crm-875.html.  
 152 Adams, 337 F. App‘x at 338, 340.  
 153 Id. at 338. The films included Doggie3Some, Anal Doggie and Horse, and Fisting 1. 
Id.  
 154 Every Dog Has Its Day in Court: Bestiality, Fisting Videos Seized in FBI Obscenity 
Bust, AVN INDUS. NEWS (July 2008), http://www.mydigitalpublication.com/publication/ 
index.php?i=4724&m=&l=&p=92&pre=&ver=swf. 
 155 Adams attempted to call a computer systems administrator to testify that by typing 
in the words ―bestiality‖ and ―fisting‖ into Internet search engines, he found thousands of 
results available in and around Martinsburg, West Virginia.  Adams argued that the 
presence of this material indicated acceptance of this type of content by the community, 
thereby satisfying the local community standards.  The Fourth Circuit affirmed the 
district court‘s rejection of this argument on the basis that ―availability/accessibility of 
content . . . does not equal acceptance of that content.‖  Clay Calvert, Wendy Brunner, 
Karla Kennedy & Kara Murrhee, Judicial Erosion of Protection for Defendants in 
Obscenity Prosecutions?: When Courts Say, Literally, Enough is Enough and When 
HERTZ-BUNZL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2011  2:00 PM 
166 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 22:145 
Occasionally, prosecutors have brought suits in multiple 
districts in order to secure indictments.  For example, in 2010, 
prosecutors in New Jersey reached a plea deal with Florida-
based
156
 operator of tortureportal.com, Barry Goldman, following 
an indictment for obscenity charges in federal court in New 
Jersey.
157
  A previous indictment against Goldman was dropped in 
Montana.
158
  Goldman‘s videos, which included Torture of a Porn 
Store Girl, were distributed via the postal mail from Goldman‘s 
website.
159
  Goldman received three years probation.
160
 
One of the key issues that has arisen in the legal challenges 
arising from these prosecutions concerns whether a national 
standard is necessary for Internet-based obscenity prosecutions, 
and whether such a standard is mandated by the Ashcroft case.
161
  
These particular questions were addressed in obscenity cases in 
2009 and 2010 by the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, and the District 
Court for the District of Columbia.
162
 
The Ninth Circuit addressed the community standards issue in 
a case arising from an e-mail spamming operation.
163
  Jeffrey 
 
Internet Availability Does Not Mean Acceptance, 1 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 7, 32 
(2010).  Other defense attorneys have attempted to make similar arguments in other 
obscenity cases.  For example, in a Pensacola, Florida case that settled out of court, a 
defense lawyer planned to use Google Trends to show ―orgy‖ was searched for more 
frequently than ―apple pie.‖ Id. at 31.  If the correct technology is used with local data 
including numbers of Internet users, defense attorneys argue, this should demonstrate 
community acceptance of Internet content. See id. at 32–33. See generally Shannon 
Creasy, Defending Against a Charge of Obscenity in the Internet Age: How Google 
Searches Can Illuminate Miller‘s “Contemporary Community Standards,” 26 GA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 1029 (2010). 
 156 Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Federal Grand Jury Charges Florida Man with 
Obscenity Violations (Sept. 16, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/ 
September/08-crm-822.html.  
 157 Rhett Pardon, Plea Deal Reached in Torture Portal Obscenity Case, XBIZ 
NEWSWIRE (July 13, 2010, 2:30 PM), http://newswire.xbiz.com/view.php?id=122757.  
 158 Id.   
 159 Id.  
 160 Rhett Pardon, 3 Years Probation for Torture Porn Operator, XBIZ NEWSWIRE, 
(Mar. 11, 2011, 10:15 AM) http://newswire.xbiz.com/view.php?id=131568.   
 161 Matthew Dawson, Comment, The Intractable Obscenity Problem 2.0: The Emerging 
Circuit Split Over the Constitutionality of “Local Community Standards” Online, 60 
CATH. U.L. REV. 719, 724 (2011). 
 162 Id. at 725.  
 163 United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1240 (9th Cir. 2009).  
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Kilbride and James Schaffer were charged in federal district court 
in Arizona
164
 with fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, 
and interstate transportation of obscene materials.
165
  The 
obscenity charges arose from two sexually explicit images that 
appeared within the defendants‘ e-mails.166  The government 
introduced the testimony of witnesses who had complained to the 
FTC about the defendant‘s emails, including their reactions to the 
pornographic images, as well as the text of complaints made to the 
FTC.
167
  The defendants were convicted and each received a prison 
term of over five years.
168
 
A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit heard the appeal.
169
  
The defendants challenged the trial judge‘s jury instruction, which 
instructed the jury to determine obscenity using ―contemporary 
community standards‖ but did not provide the precise geographic 
area of the ―community.‖170  The appellate court considered the 
defendants‘ argument that the jury instruction was incorrect in the 
context of e-mail, a medium they argued requires a national 
standard.
171
  The argument was that distribution via e-mail 
unavoidably subjects the work to the least tolerant community in 
the country, burdening First Amendment protected speech.
172
  The 
argument further contends that this speech is distinguishable from 
Hamling and Sable because there is no means to control where 
geographically the message will be received.
173
 
 
 164 Id.   
 165 Id. at 1244.  
 166 Id.  The obscenity charges in the Kilbride prosecution were not primarily a result of 
the Justice Department targeting obscenity as with the other cases discussed in this 
section.  Rather, the obscenity charges arose in the context of criminal charges stemming 
from e-mail spamming crimes. Id.  
 167 Id. at 1245.  
 168 Id.  
 169 Id. at 1244.  
 170 Id. at 1247 (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 105 (1974)). 
 171 Id.  The defendants alternatively argued that the jury instruction was invalid because 
it allowed the jury to consider standards other than those from their local community, but 
this was rejected as Hamling specifically allowed the use of a community standard 
without reference to a precise geographic definition. Id. at 1247–48.  
 172 Id. at 1250.  
 173 Id. at 1251.  
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Writing for the court, Judge Betty Fletcher identified that in 
Reno v. ACLU,  ―one of among several issues of facial overbreadth 
in the CDA‖ concerned the use of community standards as applied 
to the Internet, but that the Reno decision did not conclude that the 
use of local community standards by itself would render a statute 
facially overbroad.
174
  Ultimately, Judge Fletcher decided that 
Ashcroft v. ACLU was more applicable to the defendant‘s 
argument.
175
  Judge Fletcher noted that the ―divergent reasoning‖ 
of the justices in Ashcroft failed to provide an ―explicit holding,‖ 
but she was ―able to derive guidance from the areas of agreement 
in the various opinions‖ by viewing the holding as the position 
taken by the members concurring on the narrowest grounds.
176
 
According to Judge Fletcher, Justice Thomas‘ opinion held that 
either the application of a local or national community standard 
would pose no constitutional concern by itself.
177
 ―Justice 
O‘Connor and Justice Breyer held more narrowly that while 
application of a national community standard would not or may not 
create constitutional concern, application of local community 
standards likely would.‖178  Thus, according to Judge Fletcher, 
these two justices agreed with a limited aspect of Justice Thomas‘ 
holding, ―that the variance inherent in application of a national 
community standard would likely not pose constitutional concerns 
by itself,‖ without holding local community standards ―similarly 
unproblematic.‖179  In this narrower holding addressing the lack of 
constitutional concern of a national community standard, according 
to Fletcher, O‘Connor and Breyer were joined by justices 
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Stevens. Ultimately, Judge 
Fletcher determined that these six justices, five of whom concurred 
in the judgment, ―viewed the application of local community 
standards in defining obscenity on the Internet as generating 
serious constitutional concerns.‖180 
 
 174 Id. at 1251–52.  
 175 Id. at 1252. 
 176 Id. at 1253–54 (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)).  
 177 Id. at 1254.  
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id.  Judge Fletcher recognized that Kennedy and Stevens identified problems with 
the national standard, including that a national standard will not produce actual 
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Judge Fletcher went on to state that, as applied to obscenity 
statutes 18 U.S.C. §§ 1462 and 1465, the application of local 
standards ―generate[s] grave constitutional doubts as to the use of 
such standards.‖181  Therefore, according to Judge Fletcher, the 
district court should have applied a national standard.
182
  Despite 
this finding, Judge Fletcher did not reverse the conviction, finding 
no plain error.
183
  Instead, Judge Fletcher found the law in this area 
is highly unsettled and held that the jury instruction did not amount 
to reversible error.
184
 
Similar issues arose in the Little case.
185
  In 2008, Paul Little 
and Max World Entertainment, Inc. were convicted of distribution 
of obscene materials.
186
  California-based Little, who went by the 
name Max Hardcore, was responsible for videos in which female 
actors drank urine, vomited, and used medical and dental devices 
in sex acts.
187
  Department of Justice agents captured and copied 
five trailers found on the company‘s website, which were 
representative of the videos the website was offering for sale.
188
  In 
addition, Postal Inspectors used a Tampa shipping address to order 
five DVDs from the company‘s website, which were sent via 
postal mail.
189
  The defendants were convicted on all ten counts of 
violation of federal obscenity statutes.
190
  Little was sentenced to a 
 
uniformity as applications will vary based on juror‘s own local understanding.  She noted 
that the Kilbride holding does not preclude a future challenge to national standards. Id. at 
1254 n.8.  
 181 Id. at 1254. 
 182 Id. at 1250.  
 183 Id. at 1255.  The conviction was affirmed with a remand for a clerical correction for 
misdemeanor charges that were miswritten as felonies. Id. at 1245–46.  
 184 Id. at 1255. 
 185 United States v. Little, 365 F. App‘x 159, 162–64 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 186 Id. at 160 (affirming the ruling of the district court).  
 187 Ben Montgomery, To the Jury, obscene; to him, a day’s work, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES (June 8, 2008), http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/criminal/article611988. 
ece. 
 188 Little, 365 F. App‘x at 161.  
 189 Id.  The trailers formed the basis for the five counts under 18 U.S.C. § 1465, 
transportation of obscenity via interstate commerce or interactive computer service 
affecting such commerce. Id. No information was required from the website user before 
in order to access the trailers. See id. The DVDs formed the basis of the five counts under 
18 U.S.C. § 1461, distribution of obscenity via postal mail. Id. 
 190 Id. 
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forty-six month prison term and fines.
191
  Little‘s website was 
forfeited.
192
 
In the appeal following the conviction, the appellants 
challenged the use of local standards in an Internet-based obscenity 
case.
193
  They argued that the district court should have applied a 
national or Internet community standard as opposed to the local 
community standard of the Middle District of Florida.
194
  They 
contended that the use of local standards infringed on their First 
Amendment rights because the Internet publisher can be judged 
according to the strictest community standards in the nation, even 
if no specific speech was targeted at those communities.
195
  
Appellants distinguished themselves from the appellant in Miller 
because they ―did not direct their Internet publication at any one 
area.‖196  The appellants relied heavily on Ashcroft and Kilbride.197  
The foundation of the appellants‘ argument was the proposition 
that the ―transmission of materials over the Internet is inherently 
different than traditional, concrete, real world conveyance of 
materials.‖198 
Unconvinced, the court affirmed the conviction, declining ―to 
follow the reasoning of Kilbride.‖199  The court found that the 
portions of Ashcroft dictating a national community standard were 
―dicta, not the ruling of the court.‖200  The court cited Justice 
O‘Connor‘s concurring opinion in Ashcroft—―I write separately to 
express my views on the constitutionality and desirability of 
 
 191 Id.  Little received a $7,500 fine and a $1,000 special assessment.  Max World 
Entertainment, Inc. received thirty-three months probation and a $75,000 fine. Id. 
 192 Mark Kernes, Judge Finds Max Hardcore Guilty on All Counts in Obscenity Trial, 
AVN INDUS. NEWS (June 6, 2008, 8:58 AM), http://www.defendourporn.org/?p=29.  
 193 Little, 365 F. App‘x at 163–64. 
 194 Id.   
 195 Id. at 163.  
 196 Id.  The court pointed out that Miller was meant to protect geographically distinct 
parts of the country from each other‘s tastes, but ―Miller could not envision the 
amorphous and viral nature of the Internet.‖ Id. at 163 n.9. 
 197 Id. at 164.  
 198 Id. at 163.  
 199 Id. at 164. 
 200 Id. 
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adopting a national standard‖201—as well as Justice Kennedy‘s 
concurring opinion—―[W]e need not decide whether the statute 
invokes local or national community standards to conclude that 
vacatur and remand are in order.‖202  Therefore, the appellate court 
held that the district court did not err in using the ―average person 
of the community as a whole‖ standard of the Middle District of 
Florida.
203
 
Similar issues arose in a case originating in the District of 
Columbia.
204
  John Stagliano and his California-based production 
company, Evil Angel Productions, were indicted in 2008
205
 in 
Washington, D.C., for distribution of obscene materials.
206
  FBI 
agents downloaded a free trailer on the website and placed an order 
for two DVDs by mail by mailing a form printed from the 
defendant‘s website.207  In the course of the case, the district court 
for the District of Columbia considered a motion to dismiss the 
indictment for trafficking in obscenity because the community 
standards requirement rendered the statute overbroad.
208
  The 
defendants argued that ―the ‗community standards‘ test, 
[suppresses] more speech than is constitutionally permissible when 
 
 201 Id. at 164 n.10 (citing Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 586 (2002) (O‘Connor, J., 
concurring) (emphasis omitted).  
 202 Id. (citing Ashcroft 535 U.S. at 586 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).  
 203 Id. at 164. 
 204 United States v. Stagliano, 93 F. Supp. 2d 25, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (denying motion 
to dismiss).  
 205 Richard Abowitz, Vegas Producer Stagliano Charged with Obscenity, LA TIMES 
BLOG (Apr. 9, 2008, 10:34 AM), http://vegasblog.latimes.com/vegas/2008/04/former-
vegas-pr.html.  In regard to the mailed DVDs, the defendants were charged with 
knowingly transporting obscene materials in interstate commerce in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1465 and knowingly using an express company or common carrier to ship the 
films in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1462.  Stagliano, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 28.  In regard to the 
website trailer, the defendants were charged with knowingly using an interstate computer 
service to distribute obscene material in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1465 and knowingly using an interstate computer service to display an obscene image in 
a manner available to a person under eighteen in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 223(d). Id.  In 
addition, they were charged with intent to distribute obscene material in interstate 
commerce while engaged in the business of selling obscene material in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1466. Id.  
 206 Stagliano, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 27.  
 207 Id. at 28–29.  The trailer was entitled Fetish Fantasies Chapter 5.  The DVDs were 
entitled Milk Nymphos and Storm Squirters 2: Target Practice Id.   
 208 Id. at 27–29.  
HERTZ-BUNZL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2011  2:00 PM 
172 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 22:145 
applied to the Internet.  Because Internet publishers, unlike those 
who use mail or telephone, cannot limit the geographic reach of the 
materials they post on the Internet.‖209 
The district court determined that while Ashcroft voiced 
concerns over the community standards requirements, ―those 
concerns hardly suffice to render the more narrow obscenity 
statutes unconstitutional as applied to the Internet.‖210  The court 
continued that if ―incorporation of community standards did not by 
itself render [COPA] substantially overbroad,‖ then it certainly 
could not be true for the obscenity statutes, which are more limited 
in scope.
211
  Judge Leon expressed the argument as follows: 
[T]o the extent that the obscenity statutes are 
overbroad at all . . . it stands to reason that the 
potential scope of that overbreadth is less extensive 
than the overbreadth resulting from COPA.  After 
all, COPA threatened greater overbreath because it 
regulated far more than obscenity—it regulated 
―material that is harmful to minors.‖212 
Obscenity statutes, which exempt material with literary, 
artistic, political or scientific value and contain the requirement 
that the material appeal to the ―prurient interest‖ or be ―patently 
offensive,‖ are more limited than COPA.213  Therefore, Judge Leon 
could not invalidate the obscenity statutes when the Supreme Court 
was unwilling to invalidate COPA in the absence of substantial 
overbreadth.
214
  In addition, because the value of obscene speech is 
so low, any burden imposed upon it by an overbroad statute would 
be minimal, further weakening the argument for the invalidation of 
obscenity statutes.
215
 
 
 209 Id. at 30–31.  
 210 Id. at 31.  
 211 Id. at 32.  
 212 Id.   
 213 Id. at 33.  
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. at 33 n.9.  The defendants also argued the overbreath of the obscenity statutes 
was aggravated on the Internet by the requirement that the obscene material be evaluated 
as a whole, raising the difficulty of assessing pictures and images in the context of the 
websites on which they are found. Id. at 33–34.  The court was satisfied that limiting 
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Judge Leon also disagreed with the Kilbride court‘s reading of 
Ashcroft.
216
  Judge Leon did not find that five justices supported 
the application of a national standard.
217
  Rather, Judge Leon began 
with the premise that ―[e]ight justices concurred in the judgment 
that the use of community standards did not ‗by itself render the 
statute substantially overbroad.‘‖218  Among the eight, Leon 
continued, Thomas, Rehnquist and Scalia upheld the local standard 
―based on their belief that COPA was sufficiently narrow in its 
application.‖219  Four justices—O‘Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and 
Ginsburg—were willing to approve variations in community 
standards ―based on the amount of speech covered and the degree 
of variance among communities.‖220  However, Judge Leon did not 
find a fifth justice to support this position because Justice Breyer 
determined that a national standard should apply.
221
  Unlike the 
other justices, in Judge Leon‘s interpretation, Breyer did not 
concur with Justice O‘Connor‘s opinion not because the plaintiffs 
failed to offer proof, but because he believed, based on 
congressional intent, that the statute called for a national 
standard.
222
  Unlike his colleagues, Justice Breyer did not find that 
local community standards might be constitutional.
223
  Thus 
Breyer‘s reasoning differed from the other justices and Judge Leon 
did not find it controlling and the defendants‘ motions to dismiss 
were rejected.
224
 
The differences between the Ninth Circuit in Kilbride, the 
Eleventh Circuit in Little, and the District Court for the District of 
Columbia in Stagliano have led some scholars to call for Supreme 
 
instructions could be used to avoid this problem and ensure that works are judged as a 
whole on the Internet. Id. at 34.  
 216 Id. at 33 n.8.  
 217 See id. 
 218 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 585 (2003)).  
 219 Stagliano, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 32 n.8. 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id.  All charges were dropped in 2010 due to serious inconsistencies in the 
government testimony. See Richard Abowitz, The Stagliano Victory Party: Field Notes 
from the Justice Department’s Obscene Case against the Adult Film Industry, REASON 
(July 19, 2010), http://reason.com/archives/2010/07/19/the-stagliano-victory-party. 
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Court resolution.
225
  Clay Calvert, for example, welcomed the 
Kilbride court‘s implication that a national standard would be more 
permissive of sexual expression than that of the least tolerant 
community in the nation.
226
  However, Calvert pointed out, a 
national standard could also be difficult for jurors to apply because 
they may not have an awareness of what comprises the national 
standard.
227
 
Calvert found that the division between the Eleventh and Ninth 
Circuits, and ensuing disagreement among prominent scholars 
could provide an opportunity for the Supreme Court to ―revisit the 
Miller test generally.‖228  In the meantime, federal prosecutors will 
likely continue their aggressive prosecution campaign in 
conservative jurisdictions, but stay away from bringing cases in the 
Ninth Circuit.
229
 
Similarly, Sarah Kagan welcomed the Kilbride decision, 
arguing that ―the application of local community standards to the 
Internet, an amorphous, virtual community that transcends lines 
drawn on maps, is inappropriate.‖230  The use of the local standard 
fails to provide notice, allows for forum shopping, and chills 
speech.
231
 
In contrast, another scholar, Orin Kerr disagreed with the Ninth 
Circuit‘s interpretation of Ashcroft.232  According to Kerr: 
―[C]oncerns are not positions.  You can‘t count the number of 
Justices who had a particular thought and then say that the thought 
is somehow binding on the lower courts.‖233  In addition, Kerr 
pointed out that Miller still directly controls despite the Ashcroft 
 
 225 Calvert, supra note 9, at 80–84. 
 226 Id. at 80.  
 227 Id. at 85. 
 228 Id. at 84–85.  
 229 Id. at 85. 
 230 Sarah Kagan, Note, Obscenity on the Internet: Nationalizing the Standard to Protect 
Individual Rights, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 233, 257 (2010). 
 231 Id. at 251. 
 232 Orin Kerr, Ninth Circuit Adopts National Standard for Internet Obscenity, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY BLOG (Oct. 29, 2009), http://volokh.com/2009/10/29/ninth-circuit-adopts-
national-standard-for-internet-obscenity/.   
 233 Id. 
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ruling, and that Miller must be followed by the lower courts until 
the Supreme Court indicates otherwise.
234
 
II. CRITICISM AND PRAISE FOR COMMUNITY STANDARDS 
The courts represent one subset of the legal community divided 
over the application of obscenity law in the Internet context.  
Scholars are also divided about what standards should be applied 
in online obscenity cases.  A subset of these scholars has defended 
the use of a local standard in obscenity prosecutions.
235
  Others 
have argued that the local standard is untenable.
236
  In the wake of 
Lawrence v. Texas
237
 some scholars have questioned whether 
obscenity law should exist at all.
238
  This section identifies three 
sets of policy arguments.  The first set is critical of obscenity law, 
the community standards approach, and local standards.  The 
second set supports prosecutions of obscenity under the 
community standards approach, including the use of local 
standards.  The third set of arguments develops the theory that a 
rule requiring either local or national standards will not make a 
meaningful difference and the only way to achieve change in 
 
 234 Id. 
 235 See Timothy S.T. Bass, Obscenity in Cyberspace: Some Reasons for Retaining the 
Local Community Standard, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 471, 472 (1996); Fee, supra note 19, 
at 1692.  
 236 See Dr. Yuval Karniel & Haim Wismonsky, Pornography, Community and the 
Internet—Freedom of Speech and Obscenity on the Internet, 30 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH. 
L.J. 105, 129 (2004); Kim & Paddon, supra note 68, at 66.  Both articles argue for a 
national standard based on the nation‘s community of Internet users.  
 237 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating conviction interfering with the sexual privacy of 
consenting adults). 
 238 See Andrew Koppelman, Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
1635, 1678–79 (2005) (noting that moral harm should not be the basis of censorship of 
obscenity and modern obscenity prosecutions tend to be arbitrary in nature); Arnold H. 
Loewy, Obscenity: An Outdated Concept for the Twenty-First Century, 10 NEXUS 21, 26–
27 (2005) (finding that modern technology has limited the harms obscenity has posed to 
society and Lawrence held morality cannot justify legislation); see also Elizabeth M. 
Glazer, When Obscenity Discriminates, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1379, 1425 (2008) (noting 
that obscenity doctrine has produced a discriminatory effect against gays and lesbians).  
Jeffrey Rosen has argued that with the rise of hard-core pornography as a large industry, 
it has become impossible to develop social consensus about what constitutes obscenity in 
any community. See Jeffrey Rosen, The End of Obscenity, 6 NEW ATLANTIS 75, 80 
(2004), available at http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-end-of-obscenity. 
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obscenity law is to change the community standards approach 
altogether. 
A. Obscenity’s Troubling Elements 
Arguments against the community standards test and the use of 
a local standard, emphasize due process, vagueness, and 
overbreadth concerns.  The due process problem occurs when 
individuals in certain communities want to purchase content and 
producers and distributors are willing to sell it to them.  Under the 
community standards approach, producers and distributors may be 
subject to criminal penalties solely because of where the buyer 
lives, even if the buyer himself voluntarily and knowingly 
purchased the material.
239
  In this fact pattern, the state (or more 
specifically the local community), is making moral choices for an 
individual.  The Supreme Court, in cases like Lawrence, has 
disapproved of this type of state-influenced moral decision-
making.
240
  Nevertheless, the Third Circuit rejected a due process 
challenge to the obscenity statutes on exactly this basis in the 
Extreme Associates case.
241
  The due process criticism of 
community standards is not unique to the Internet in particular, and 
would be valid for any medium through which obscenity is 
distributed.
242
 
In addition, there is a vagueness problem associated with the 
community standards test.  Producers might not know how to 
comply with obscenity law—how to create pornography without 
 
 239 See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 144 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(―National distributors choosing to send their products in interstate travels will be forced 
to cope with the community standards of every hamlet into which their goods may 
wander.‖). 
 240 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 585 (holding that ―a law branding one class of 
persons as criminal based solely on the State‘s moral disapproval of that class and the 
conduct associated with that class runs contrary to the values of the Constitution and the 
Equal Protection Clause under any standard of review.‖). 
 241 See United States v. Extreme Assocs., 431 F.3d 150, 151–54 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(rejecting the principle that after Lawrence ―the government can no longer rely on the 
advancement of a moral code‖ as a compelling state interest inconsistent with Supreme 
Court holdings on obscenity).   
 242 See Hamling, 418 U.S. at 144 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Brennan‘s Hamling 
dissent concerned obscenity distributed via the postal mail, but raised concerns about 
punishing the producer simply because of where his products could possibly travel).  
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facing criminal prosecution.
243
  Trends in what is prosecuted have 
altered over time.  For instance, the current focus of the Justice 
Department is on extreme sexual acts, but in the 1980s many 
prosecutions were focused on more traditional pornography.
244
  By 
the early 1980s, most state prosecutors had ceased prosecuting ―the 
most common types of hard-core pornography.‖245  When the 
targets of what is obscene change over time, there is no way to 
know what to produce and what not to produce.  This is again not a 
new problem unique to the Internet era, but rather has been a 
longstanding criticism of Miller.
246
 
The third criticism of the community standards approach is the 
issue of overbreadth and the potential chilling effect on protected 
speech.  There is no clear method by which distributors can 
anticipate which communities to avoid.
247
  Like the vagueness and 
due process critiques, the overbreadth problem is not necessarily 
unique to the Internet but it may be exacerbated by it.  The Internet 
has made much more content available and freely accessible.  The 
Internet allows for the widespread dispersal of information to all 
communities in the United States, without regard for location.  If 
producers must cater to the limitations imposed by the most 
conservative communities that will limit speech and likely render 
obscenity laws overbroad in the context of the Internet. 
B. Defending the Prosecution of Internet Obscenity 
There are also arguments in support of the community 
standards approach and the use of local standards in the Internet 
 
 243 Justice Douglas dissented in Miller and argued that an administrative censor 
reviewing work prior to publication would be better than the community standards 
approach; at least then ―the publisher would know when he was on dangerous ground‖ 
and could decide to defy the censor or not. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 41 (1973) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting).  The Miller approach creates ―ex post facto law.‖ Id. 
 244 For instance, the material at issue in Bagnell consisted of ―oral, anal, and genital 
copulation‖ among heterosexual and homosexual actors. United States v. Bagnell, 679 
F.2d 826, 837 (11th Cir. 1982).  Hamling involved group intercourse, oral sex, and 
masturbatory acts. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 92–93 (1974). 
 245 Fee, supra note 19, at 1695–96.  
 246 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 41 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Douglas‘ dissent in Miller 
concerned obscenity distributed via the postal mail, but addressed concerns about not 
knowing what material produced could be considered obscene).  
 247 Fee, supra note 19, at 1715. 
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context.
248
  Local standards may be considered necessary to protect 
conservative communities from the most intense pornography on 
the Internet, including bestiality,
249
 pissing and vomiting 
scenarios,
250
 and simulated rape.
251
  To the extent Miller and the 
community standards approach provide a justification for 
prosecuting this material, there is an increased rationale to do so as 
the Internet allows this extreme material to reach intolerant 
communities quickly and easily.
252
 
Keeping obscenity removed from easily accessible parts of the 
Internet helps achieve a goal of Miller—namely, allowing 
communities to decide what content to make available.  In Paris 
Adult Theatre, the Court expressed concerns over ―decency,‖ 
―quality of life,‖ and the ―tone of commerce‖ when discussing the 
regulation of adult movie theatres.
253
  Some consider obscenity to 
have so little value and contribute so little to society, that banning 
it preserves the ―social interest in order and morality.‖254  Using 
local community standards on the Internet, and doing so by 
holding the entire country to the standard of its most conservative 
communities, may in fact safeguard the communities most 
threatened by extreme material. 
Critics of community standards and of the local standard in 
particular often label prosecutorial practices in regard to obscenity 
on the Internet ―forum shopping.‖255  These prosecutions, however, 
may be considered positive, as they respect ―the autonomy of those 
communities where obscenity is unlikely to be tolerated.‖256  The 
result of these prosecutions may ultimately limit the production of 
certain kinds of extreme content altogether or force pornography 
 
 248 See generally Bass, supra note 236. 
 249 See United States v. Adams, 337 F. App‘x 336, 338 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 250 See Montgomery, supra note 188.  
 251 See Dotinga, supra note 143.  
 252 See id. (―Extreme material is especially popular on the internet.‖). 
 253 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57–58 (1973). 
 254 Fee, supra note 19, at 1719 (citing Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass‘n, 127 S. Ct. 
2372, 2381 (2007)). 
 255 Dotinga, supra note 143 (―[F]ederal prosecutors decided to pursue the case in 
Pittsburgh because they think it‘s more likely to cough up conservative jurors.‖). 
 256 Fee, supra note 19, at 1716–17. 
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producers to be selective, to the extent possible with the Internet, 
in where they distribute content. 
This kind of a chilling effect on production is not a new 
development in the pornography industry.  For instance, the cable 
pay-per-view pornography industry tailors content to hotels in 
different areas of the country.
257
  Producers may also simply 
decide not to ship content to certain areas of the country.
258
  For 
example, most adult companies will not ship content to Utah.
259
  It 
is true, however, that the Internet is different than cable television.  
In its current technological form content cannot be directed to 
particular localities and not others.
260
  But despite this general 
limitation, Internet distributors may be able to create limited 
content barriers based on geography through the development of 
more accurate limiting technology, including firewalls, to 
geographically restrict user access.
261
  This process would allow 
producers of obscene material to control the areas into which they 
distribute and thereby ensure its legality. 
C. Questioning Distinctions Between Local and National 
Standards 
The third set of arguments focuses on whether a national or a 
local standard would make a meaningful difference in obscenity 
prosecutions.  Some have argued that there is no meaningful 
distinction between the local and national standards in reducing 
obscenity laws‘ chilling effect on free speech, because speakers on 
national networks ―will still be unable to predict how every jury in 
every community will view the ‗national‘ decency standard.‖262  In 
 
 257 Calvert, supra note 9, at 71–72.  
 258 Id. at 70.  
 259 Id. 
 260 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 569–70 (2002).   
 261 Frequently Asked Questions, HULU.COM, http://www.hulu.com/about/media_faq 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2011); Frequently Asked Questions, NETFLIX.COM 
https://www.netflix.com/Help?faqtrkid=4&p_search_text=abroad&srch=Search (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2011) (―Q: Can I watch instantly outside the United States? A: We 
currently have the rights to distribute streaming content within the United States and 
Canada. This means you may only watch instantly on your compatible computer or 
Netflix-ready device within the 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia and Canada.‖).  
 262 See Sergent, supra note 20, at 716 (arguing that obscenity should receive the same 
First Amendment protections as ordinary speech).  
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Ashcroft, Justice Thomas pointed out that even if a national 
standard existed, jurors would still reach inconsistent 
conclusions.
263
  Justice O‘Connor similarly expressed the concern 
that even with a national standard, jurors would still ―inevitably 
base their assessments to some extent on the experience of their 
local communities.‖264  Thus, even with a national standard, 
prosecutors would still be able to forum shop and bring cases in 
those jurisdictions with less tolerant communities. 
While the standard currently in place is termed the local 
standard, in actuality the standard used by courts varies from case 
to case.  However, the variety in the kinds of standards used has 
not resulted in different outcomes.  To demonstrate this point, 
consider the various standards and instructions used by courts 
across the nation.  In Bagnell, the jury was instructed to consider 
the standards of the ―southern district of Florida, particularly Dade 
County.‖265  In Little, the district court instructed the jury to 
consider the standards of the Middle District of Florida.
266
  In 
Thomas, the court applied the standards of the Western District of 
Tennessee.
267
  In Miller, the jury was instructed to evaluate the 
materials by the standards of the state of California.
268
  In other 
cases the community has not been geographically defined at all.  In 
Kilbride, for example, the jury was instructed that the community 
was not to be defined by any particular geographic area and that 
they could consider evidence from outside the particular district of 
the trial.
269
  In Hamling, the jury was expressly instructed to 
consider a national standard—―the standard throughout this 
 
 263 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 567–77  (2002). 
 264 Id. at 589 (O‘Connor, J., concurring). 
 265 United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 835 (11th Cir. 1982).  The use of Dade 
County was acceptable despite it being a smaller area than the judicial district because 
Miller envisioned no precise geographic area when determining community standards. Id. 
at 835–36.  The point was only to allow the juror to draw on the community from which 
he comes to assess the conclusion that the average person, applying community 
standards, would reach in a particular case. Id. 
 266 United States v. Little, 365 F. App‘x 159, 163–64 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 267 United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 711 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 268 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 15 (1973). 
 269 United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1248 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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country concerning sex and matters pertaining to sex.‖270  Each of 
these cases involved a similar fact pattern and each resulted in 
either guilty pleas or a conviction.
271
  Given the consistency in 
results among the variety of standards currently in place, it is 
unclear why or how the results might differ if juries were always 
instructed to use a national standard. 
On the other hand, it is also possible that a national standard 
could change outcomes, especially over time.  If jurors are 
consistently introduced to one set of clearly defined community 
practices and standards, it is conceivable that this would lead to 
increased consistency across the nation in what is considered 
obscene and what is not.
272
  If the practices of the national 
community being considered included residents of large urban 
centers as well as smaller rural towns—and everywhere in 
between, thereby forming a representative sample of the nation‘s 
various viewpoints—one would expect consistency across 
jurisdictions. 
A switch to a national standard would also likely enhance the 
ability of defense lawyers to raise comprehensive defenses to 
obscenity charges.  Defense attorneys could introduce evidence 
that the materials are present in the community and demonstrate 
that the charged material does not in fact violate the community‘s 
standards of obscenity.  For example, in one non-Internet-based 
obscenity case from Utah, a defense lawyer introduced into 
evidence data on local residents‘ use of cable and satellite pay-per-
view television pornography in local hotels, resulting in a not 
guilty verdict.
273
  Under local standards, it is difficult for defense 
lawyers to show that the residents of a particular geographic 
 
 270 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 103 (1974).  The Miller Court disapproved 
of this jury instruction but did not find it rendered the conviction void. Miller, 413 U.S. at 
31.  
 271 See supra Part I (discussing each of these cases in detail).  
 272 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 589 (2002) (O‘Connor, J., concurring) (―the 
existence of the Internet, and its facilitation of national dialogue, has itself made jurors 
more aware of the views of adults in other parts of the United States.‖).  
 273 See Timothy Egan, EROTICA INC.—A Special Report.; Technology Sent Wall 
Street Into Market for Pornography, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2000, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/23/us/erotica-special-report-technology-sent-wall-
street-into-market-for-pornography.html?src=pm. 
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community use the Internet in a certain way, just as it is difficult 
for Internet producers to limit the distribution of their content to 
any particular geographic part of the country.
274
  A national 
standard would likely open the door to more evidence from around 
the nation, including the nationwide popularity of pornographic 
websites.  Strengthening this defense may alleviate concerns 
defendants face about being tried anywhere in the country for 
obscenity.  It is therefore critical to determine whether the adoption 
of a national standard would significantly change the community 
standards approach to resolve disputes over the application of 
obscenity law to the Internet. 
III. OBSCENITY LAW LACKS A SIMPLE PATH FORWARD 
Obscenity law is currently in a state of uncertainty.  The 
Ashcroft decision does not mandate the use of a national standard 
in adult obscenity cases.
275
  The Kilbride court misinterpreted the 
divergent opinions in Ashcroft.
276
  The Ashcroft justices were clear 
that the holding was limited to obscene material aimed at children, 
and did not extend to obscenity aimed at adults.
277
  From a policy 
standpoint, the choice between a national and a local standard may 
not have a large impact on obscenity prosecutions, as prosecutors 
would still be able to bring charges against obscenity in districts 
across the nation even under a national standard.
278
  Nonetheless, 
critics of obscenity law make a strong case that the local 
community standards approach violates due process, and is vague 
and overbroad, especially when applied to the Internet.
279
  
Ultimately, the only chance for real reform in this area requires 
reevaluating the entire community standards approach to 
obscenity, and either specifically defining obscene content or 
 
 274 See Ascroft, 535 U.S. at 595 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing that identifying 
Internet usage by locality is more difficult than identifying local cable and satellite pay-
per-view television usage which can be easily tracked to certain hotels or residential 
communities). 
 275 See generally Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 564.   
 276 United States v. Kilbride, 584 F. 3d 1240, 1252–54 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 277 See Ashcroft, 353 U.S. at 570, 578–79. 
 278 See Sergent, supra note 20, at 674–76.  
 279 See Calvert, supra note 9, at 85. 
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repealing obscenity laws altogether.
280
  Alternatively, there may 
also be technological solutions by which Internet content could be 
more purposefully directed at geographic areas within the United 
States.
281
  Even without a technological solution, access to Internet 
sources can be limited in parts of the country through digital access 
applications and the distributions of some content through non-
Internet mediums.
282
  It is clear that more fundamental change is 
needed in this area of the law. 
A. Ashcroft’s Limited Holding 
In the wake of the Ashcroft decision, the Kilbride court held 
that a national standard was necessary in adult Internet obscenity 
cases.
283
  However, Ashcroft does not require a national standard in 
adult Internet obscenity cases and the Kilbride case was wrongly 
decided.  The Kilbride method of understanding the position of 
five justices in Ashcroft is flawed.  Fundamentally, the overbreadth 
concerns set forth in Ashcroft concerning COPA do not apply to 
adult obscenity statutes, as COPA concerned a much larger scope 
of material.  The justices in Ashcroft made clear that they were 
addressing the standard for material directed at minors under 
COPA, and did not extend the holding to standards for adult 
obscenity under federal obscenity statutes. 
In the Kilbride case, Judge Fletcher looked for agreement 
among five concurring justices on the narrowest possible 
grounds.
284
  In her interpretation, the Thomas group held that there 
was no requirement to use either a local or a national standard.
285
  
In addition, according to Fletcher, the O‘Connor, Kennedy, Breyer 
and Stevens opinions each found significant problems with the use 
 
 280 For example, in Canada the courts have moved away from a community standards 
approach and have turned towards a definition of obscenity based on harm or significant 
risk of harm posed by the content, including harm to the functioning of society, the 
creation of anti-social behavior and the degradation of women. See Boyce, supra note 8, 
at 335–38.  Scholars have also put forward arguments for abolishing obscenity laws 
altogether. See Koppelman supra, note 238, at 1636; Loewy, supra note 238, at 22.  
 281 See Guernsey, supra note 23, at G1. 
 282 See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. 564, 583 (2002). 
 283 United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1250 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 284 Id. at 1253–54.  
 285 Id. at 1252. 
HERTZ-BUNZL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2011  2:00 PM 
184 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 22:145 
of local community standards for Internet obscenity or indecency, 
but not with the use of a national standard.
286
  Therefore, Fletcher 
concluded, five justices concurred in the use of a national 
standard—O‘Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.287 
One key problem with Fletcher‘s approach is that the 
hesitations expressed by justices O‘Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer 
regarding the use of the local standard are not part of the Court‘s 
holding but are, as the Little court asserted, dicta.
288
  Every 
hesitation a justice has about other possible scenarios is not a part 
of the holding and as Orin Kerr has pointed out, ―concerns are not 
positions.‖289  Another problem with Kilbride’s five-justice count 
is that, as the Stagliano court highlighted, the justices‘ opinions are 
very different from one another.  The Thomas group held that 
COPA was not overbroad as applied to the Internet because it was 
never problematic for variations in local community standards to 
exist.
290
  O‘Connor stressed that the use of local community 
standards in Internet cases could be problematic, but that there was 
not enough evidence to find it problematic based on what was 
before her.
291
  Kennedy similarly did not believe that there was 
sufficient evidence before the court to reach a ruling on COPA‘s 
facial constitutionality, but identified possible problems with 
applying a community standards approach to the Internet.
292
  
Breyer concurred in the judgment, but for a different reason; 
Breyer believed COPA already called for a national standard.
293
  
Therefore, his reasoning is unique to the law before him—
COPA—and is not applicable to other laws that were not before 
the Court. Therefore, Judge Fletcher‘s assertion in Kilbride that 
five justices—Breyer, O‘Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and 
 
 286 Id. at 1254. 
 287 Id. 
 288 United States v. Little, 365 F. App‘x 159, 164 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 289 Kerr, supra note 233.  
 290 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 583 (2002). 
 291 Id. at 586–87 (O‘Connor, J., concurring).  O‘Connor thought, for instance, that 
much of the possibly problematic material that the plaintiffs introduced would have 
literary, artistic, political or scientific value for minors and would thus be exempted. Id. 
 292 Id. at 592–93 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 293 Id. at 589 (Breyer, J., concurring).  Breyer also acknowledged problems with the use 
of a local standard. Id. at 590. 
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Ginsberg—take the same position in Ashcroft is incorrect.294  Only 
four justices take the position she asserts because she wrongfully 
included Breyer. 
Ashcroft primarily concerned whether COPA was overbroad.
295
  
The argument that COPA was overbroad rested on the premise that 
the law suppressed excessive adult material in proportion to the 
statute‘s legitimate scope.296  This disparity could be aggravated by 
the application of local community standards to the Internet, 
exacerbating variations in standards utilized across the nation.
297
  
Because Internet content providers cannot control where they send 
their material, a fear of being prosecuted under the act would force 
them to cater to the most puritanical communities and could 
suppress speech; content could be forced behind age verification 
screens or off the Internet entirely.
298
  This would limit the speech 
of adults, and of minors, in more tolerant communities.
299
 
The federal obscenity statutes, coupled with the application of 
community standards to the Internet, raise similar concerns.
300
  
However, the obscenity statutes cover less material than COPA.
301
  
The scope of COPA extends to the communication or making 
available of harmful material to minors for commercial 
purposes.
302
  The federal obscenity statutes are limited to hardcore 
pornography that satisfies the Miller test.
303
 
 
 294 United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1254 (2009). 
 295 See generally Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 583.  
 296 See id. at 609–10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 297 See id. at 593–96 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 298 See id. at 590 (Breyer, J., concurring); Id. at 605 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 299 See id. at 604, 611. 
 300 See Kagan, supra note 231, at 336–39. 
 301 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (2006), with 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2006). 
 302 See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 570.  COPA defined material ―harmful to minors‖ as any 
content that a jury could find exceeds community standards with respect to minors 
through its appeal to the ―prurient interest‖ of minors, ―in a manner patently offensive 
with  respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or 
simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-
pubescent female breast and lacks literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for 
minors.‖ See 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6).  
 303 See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 115 (1974) (―It is plain from the Court 
of Appeals‘ description of the brochure involved here that it is a form of hard-core 
pornography well within the types of permissibly proscribed depictions described in 
Miller.‖); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160–61 (1974) (overturning obscenity 
HERTZ-BUNZL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2011  2:00 PM 
186 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 22:145 
If COPA was not held to be overbroad because of variations in 
community standards in Ashcroft, it stands to reason that the 
federal obscenity statutes would not be overbroad because they 
apply to less material.
304
  The Stagliano opinion expressed it best: 
―Surely I cannot do to the obscenity statutes what the Supreme 
Court was unwilling to do to COPA in the absence of substantial 
overbreadth.‖305 
It is clear from the opinions in the Ashcroft case that most of 
the justices were thinking of the federal obscenity statutes as a 
separate category from COPA.  Justice Thomas indicated that he 
did not believe that the variations in community standards under 
COPA for the limited amount of material it covered—namely, 
obscene material directed at minors—would be greater than the 
variations under the federal obscenity statutes.
306
  The opinion 
postulated that if COPA was unconstitutional because of 
community standards, so would the obscenity statutes as ―applied 
to the Web‖307 and this would be in tension with Reno, where 
appellees conceded that the CDA applied to obscene speech.
308
  
Similarly, Justice Kennedy voted to remand Ashcroft in part 
because of the absence of findings as to whether the variations in 
community standards under COPA would be any more severe than 
variations under the federal obscenity statutes.
309
  Justice Stevens 
dissented because COPA was unconstitutionally broad compared 
to traditional adult obscenity laws because it extended to images in 
commonplace advertisements and magazines that might be 
inappropriate for minors.
310
 
 
conviction for the film Carnal Knowledge). Miller ―was certainly intended to fix 
substantive constitutional limitations, deriving from the First Amendment, on the type of 
material subject to such a determination[,]‖ which are inconsistent with a conviction 
based ―on a defendant‘s depiction of a woman with a bare midriff.‖ Jenkins, 418 U.S. 
160–61. 
 304 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973). 
 305 United States v. Stagliano, 693 F. Supp. 2d 25, 33 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 306 See Ashcroft,  535 U.S. at 583–84. 
 307 See id. at 584. 
 308 See id.; Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 883 (1997). 
 309 See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 598–99 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 310 See id. at 611–12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing material, Justice Stevens 
stated, ―[t]he kind of hard-core pornography involved in Hamling, which I assume would 
be obscene under any community‘s standard, does not belong on the Internet.‖).  It is 
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B. Possible Solutions 
A national standard is not mandated by case law for obscenity 
aimed at adults, and it may be inappropriate from a policy 
perspective.  There is considerable debate about whether using a 
local or national standard will result in meaningfully different 
outcomes.  Therefore, it may be the case that the problems with 
obscenity law are inherent in the community standards approach 
itself rather than the varying definition of community standards. 
There are strong criticisms of the community standards 
approach to obscenity.
311
  The vagueness and due process 
criticisms regarding obscenity on the Internet are in many ways 
similar to arguments regarding the enforcement of obscenity law 
with respect to previous mediums, including the postal mail in 
Hamling and telephone services in Sable.  If that were the case, 
there would not be a need for a national community standard or a 
change in obscenity law because of the Internet, as the policy 
problems would not be substantially different than those 
encountered in obscenity law in pre-Internet times. 
However, it may be that the lack of geographic boundaries and 
the accessibility of the vast array of content on the Internet have 
created a situation in which the number of communities that 
welcome obscene material dwarfs the number of unwelcoming 
communities.  This has the potential to be an overbreadth problem 
of the kind addressed in Reno, where the CDA‘s attempt to protect 
minors by limiting adult speech was too restrictive.
312
 
This problem of varying tolerances in different communities 
could be solved if there was a perfect technological solution that 
allowed Internet providers to target specific communities.  Internet 
Protocol (IP) addresses can be mapped to a geographic location to 
 
important to note, however, that Justice O‘Connor‘s opinion did apply to adult obscenity. 
Id. at 587 (O‘Connor, J., concurring) (―The use of local community standards will cause 
problems . . . for adults as well as children in future cases . . . . Where adult speech is 
concerned, for instance, there may in fact be a greater degree of disagreement about what 
is patently offensive or appeals to the prurient interest.‖). 
 311 See supra part II.A (discussing criticisms of the obscenity doctrine).   
 312 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997). 
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limit access to websites.
313
  Many are familiar with such 
restrictions when they unsuccessfully try to access sites with 
limited copyright distribution rights, such as video streaming sites 
Hulu or Netflix, from foreign jurisdictions.
314
  In recent years, 
courts have considered this technology too imprecise to limit 
access to certain jurisdictions or prohibitively expensive.
315
  
However, while it is not perfect, the technology has advanced over 
time and studies have demonstrated 85–98 percent accuracy in 
identifying the state associated with an IP address.
316
  A sign of the 
increasing acceptance of geolocation technologies is a proposed 
federal Internet gambling law, mandating that gambling sites use 
these geo-location technologies.
317
 
While a perfect technological solution may be unavailable, 
imperfect solutions are already in place involving limitations on 
access.
318
  These methods involve content producers and 
 
 313 See Kevin F. King, Geolocation and Federalism on the Internet: Cutting Internet 
Gambling’s Gordian Knot, 11 COLUM SCI & TECH. L. REV. 41, 58 (2010).  
 314 See Frequently Asked Questions, HULU.COM, supra note 261 (―Currently, Hulu is a 
U.S. service only. . .  . To [service other regions] . . . , Hulu must clear the rights for each 
show or film in each specific geographic region, which will take time.‖); see also 
Frequently Asked Questions, NETFLIX.COM, supra note 261 (last visited Apr. 9, 2011) 
(―We currently [only] have the rights to distribute streaming content within the United 
States and Canada . . . .‖).  
 315 Boyce, supra note 8, at 347 (citing ACLU v. Gonzalez, 478 F. Supp. 2d 775, 820 
n.13 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (considering COPA on remand from the Supreme Court)).  
 316 See King, supra note 314, at 59 (exploring how geolocation technologies could be 
used to make Internet gambling regulation more responsive to longstanding federalism 
principles). 
 317 Id. at 63 (providing that the proposed Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer 
Protection, and Enforcement Act ―would require gambling sites to use geolocation 
technologies to ensure that the individual placing a bet or wager is physically located in a 
jurisdiction that permits Internet gambling . . . .‖).  
 318 The producers in Thomas required a membership application, including a home 
address, before content could be downloaded.  United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 705 
(6th Cir. 1996).  The producers in Extreme Associates required a membership form, 
which included credit card information, before content could be received by Internet or 
postal mail. United States v. Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 581–82 (W.D. Pa. 
2005).  A credit card billing address is not synonymous with a home address, but billing 
addresses may correlate with where customers actually live.  Billing addresses can be an 
imperfect substitute to provide distributors with information to identify the part of the 
country from which the recipient originates.  This raises the possibility that a customer 
could lie about their geographic location. In such an instance, content producers might 
HERTZ-BUNZL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2011  2:00 PM 
2011] COMMUNITY STANDARDS IN THE INTERNET ERA 189 
distributors using the internet for teasers and trailers, and then 
mailing the full content.
319
  Content producers and distributors can 
require users to provide a residential address or billing address as 
part of credit card information.
320
  This would allow the content 
providers to decide whether to send content, by mail, to 
jurisdictions where they may not wish to face an obscenity 
prosecution.  Producers would be able to choose not to do business 
with a customer located within a certain community.  This 
approach would not hinder the ability of adults in welcoming 
communities to easily access material, but would prevent at least 
the downloading or mailing of obscene content to less welcoming 
communities.
321
  Such imperfect solutions serve a broader goal of 
Miller by ensuring that objectionable content is not available—or 
at least not readily available—in unwelcoming communities. 
Ultimately, real reform in this area of the law will not be 
reached by tweaking whether community standards are defined as 
local or national in jury instructions.  The very notion of varying 
communities making different decisions about content across the 
country creates a legal structure that is particularly ill-attuned to 
distribution mechanisms that at present are particularly insensitive 
to geography.  Change will only come by more dramatic 
alterations to this area of the law.  Such alterations may include 
 
conceivably claim they took every reasonable step to ensure the material was being sent 
to a certain community and not another.   
 319 In Little and Stagliano some content was online and openly accessible and some was 
shipped by mail. See United States v. Little, 365 F. App‘x 159, 161 (11th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Stagliano, 693 F. Supp. 2d 25, 28–29 (D.D.C. 2010).   
 320 See, e.g., Thomas, 74 F.3d at 705 (involving a membership application that required 
a home address); Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 581–82 (involving a membership 
form that included credit card information). 
 321 Forcing adults in tolerant communities to encounter paywalls and other screening 
devices may raise anonymity concerns of the kind discussed in Ashcroft.  See Ashcroft v. 
ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 667 (2004) (upholding the invalidation of COPA as not the least 
restrictive way for Congress to protect children on the Internet, considering the existence 
of filtering technologies).  ―Under a filtering regime, childless adults may gain access to 
speech they have a right to see without having to identify themselves or provide their 
credit card information.‖ Id. at 667.  It is arguable whether the need for anonymity would 
be as compelling in a situation involving adults attempting to access adult obscenity as 
opposed to content that is unproblematic for adults but problematic for children.  In 
addition, some of these screening devices may already exist on pornographic websites to 
ensure viewers are not minors.  
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abolishing the community standards approach to make obscenity a 
specifically defined crime with uniform definitions, or repealing 
laws aimed at obscenity directed at adults altogether. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts have long struggled with how to best apply the 
community standards approach to regulate obscene material.  
Ashcroft did not determine that a national community standard 
must be applied to instances of adult obscenity on the Internet.  On 
the one hand, the logic of community standards suggests that as the 
Internet poses a greater danger to intolerant communities, more 
measures are justified to prevent that dissemination.  However, a 
high burden is placed on Internet content providers and 
distributors, who cannot effectively limit distribution of their 
material to certain locations without functionally keeping it off the 
Internet altogether.  Ultimately, asking a jury to apply a local or 
national standard may be immaterial when community standards 
allow every jurisdiction in the nation to make its own decision 
about whether a given piece of content is obscene.  There may be a 
technological solution to improve the ability of the Internet to 
reach specific areas of the country, or non-technological solutions 
to reach the same result.  In the end, more fundamental questions 
must be addressed about the validity of the very concept of the 
community standards rationale and the obscenity exception to the 
First Amendment.  Until there is a solution, Internet-based 
obscenity distributors will continue to face prosecution in 
communities across the nation. 
 
